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CAN MY DADDY HUG ME?: DECIDING WHETHER
VISITING DAD IN A PRISON FACILITY IS IN THE
BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD
Deciding what is best for a child often poses a question no less
ultimate than the purposes and value of life itself.1
INTRODUCTION
Amanda Smith was thirteen years old when her father,
Robert, petitioned the court to have her visit with him in pris-
on on weekends and holidays.2 Robert has been incarcerated
since Amanda was three years old. He is serving a life sen-
tence for murder, robbery, and kidnaping at the Eastern Ken-
tucky Correctional Complex in West Liberty, Kentucky.' In his
petition, Robert alleged that Amanda's mother, Edna,4 had
been bringing Amanda to visit with him in prison. However,
after he and Edna divorced, Edna refused to continue bringing
Amanda to the prison.5
The trial court ordered Robert to file a detailed plan of his
proposed visitation, which he promptly filed.' Thereafter, with-
out conducting a hearing, the trial court denied Robert's peti-
tion, stating that "the Court has examined the record including
the Petitioner's motions and heard argument of [Ednal's Coun-
sel [and] finds that it is inappropriate at this point to consider
issues involving the parties' children because of the Petitioner's
incarceration."'
R. MNOOKIN, IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN 18 (1985).
2 Smith v. Smith, 869 S.W.2d 55, 55 (Ky. Ct. App. 1994).
3Id.
" Robert and Edna were divorced in November, 1989. The divorce decree de-
ferred the issue of visitation and support because Robert was a prisoner. Id.
5Id.
6 Id. at 56.
7 Smith, 869 S.W.2d at 56.
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The Court of Appeals of Kentucky reversed the trial court's
denial of visitation.' In its opinion, the court of appeals
seemed perplexed as to how and when the trial court would
have had an opportunity to hear Edna's counsel's argument in
opposition to Robert's petition because the court never held a
hearing.' The appellate court instructed that, under
Kentucky's statutory scheme, a non-custodial parent "cannot
be denied visitation with his or her child unless there has been
a finding that visitation will seriously endanger the child.""
The court recognized that the statute created a presumption
that visitation with both parents is in a child's best interest
"for the obvious reason that a child needs and deserves the
affection and companionship of both its parents."" Regardless
of the grievous nature of Robert's crime, "his status as an in-
mate in a penal institution alone does not make visitation with
his child inappropriate." 2 The appellate court explained that
had the trial court conducted a fact-finding hearing in which it
was proven that Amanda would suffer serious harm from visit-
ing her father in prison, then a denial of visitation would be
upheld." Accordingly, the appellate court remanded the case
for entry of an order establishing a visitation schedule for
Amanda with her father. 4
The appellate court did not promote the best interests of





12 Smith, 869 S.W.2d at 57; see also Lonobile v. Betkowski, 261 A.D.2d 829,
829, 689 N.Y.S.2d 790, 790 (4th Dep't 1999) (finding that a parent's incarceration
will not, by itself, render visitation inappropriate); Rhynes v. Rhynes, 242 A.D.2d
943, 943, 662 N.Y.S.2d 667, 667 (4th Dep't 1997) (finding that a parent's incarcer-
ation, standing alone, does not render visitation inappropriate); Simpson v.
Finnigan, 202 A.D.2d 592, 592, 609 N.Y.S.2d 265, 266 (2d Dep't 1994) (explaining
that a parent's incarceration alone does not make visitation with that parent's
child inappropriate); Vann v. Vann, 187 A.D.2d 821, 821, 589 N.Y.S.2d 715, 716
(3d Dep't 1992) (stating that the father's incarceration alone does not mean that
his right to visitation should automatically be forfeited); Wise v. Del Toro, 122
A.D.2d 714, 714-15, 505 N.Y.S.2d 880, 881 (1st Dep't 1986) (holding that a
parent's incarceration alone-does not make visitation with that parent's child inap-
propriate); Harris v. Burns, 904 P.2d 648, 650 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that a
parent's incarceration does not invariably require that visitation be denied).
13 Smith, 869 S.W.2d at 57.
14 Id.
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rather than remanding for a full evidentiary hearing. More-
over, the lack of an evidentiary hearing in this case is particu-
larly worrisome because Amanda was thirteen years old, an
age at which she should have had her wishes considered. Nei-
ther the trial court nor the appellate court gave Amanda an
opportunity to be heard on the visitation issue, the outcome of
which would have a substantial impact on the rest of her life.
As this Note will demonstrate, many trial court child visi-
tation orders to prison facilities are reversed by appellate
courts due to lack of evidentiary hearings, 5 expert witness-
es, 16 or attorneys to represent the children." However, in
most of the reversals, the appellate courts gave little, if any,
guidance to the trial courts as to what factors the courts
should examine in determining whether to allow the child to
visit with her father in prison.'" Although the Kentucky Court
of Appeals was correct in reversing the trial court's decision in
Amanda Smith's case, it would have been much more benefi-
cial to Amanda and other children in her situation 9 if the
appellate court remanded for an evidentiary hearing and pro-
vided the lower court with specific guidelines to protect the
welfare of Amanda.
This Note will focus specifically on incarcerated fathers
because, generally, it is the imprisoned father who is an unwed
parent" and, accordingly, is not respected and protected as
much in the law as are married fathers or mothers.2' The ma-
1" See, e.g., Alexander v. Alexander, 900 S.W.2d 615, 616 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995);
Sharpe v. Carpenter, 256 A.D.2d 1231, 1231, 684 N.Y.S.2d 108, 108 (4th Dep't
1998); Vann, 187 A.D.2d at 821, 589 N.Y.S.2d at 715; Sullivan v. Shaw, 650 A.2d
882, 884 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994); Wolfe v. Wolfe, 899 P.2d 46, 48 (Wyo. 1995).
1 See, e.g., Youngblood v. Amrhein, 216 A.D.2d 475, 475, 628 N.Y.S.2d 386,
386 (2d Dep't 1995); Shipp v. Gaglia, 97 A.D.2d 945, 945, 468 N.Y.S.2d 743, 743
(4th Dep't 1983).
1 See, e.g., Folsom v. Folsom, 262 A.D.2d 875, 876, 692 N.Y.S.2d 529, 529 (3d
Dep't 1999); Del Toro, 122 A.D.2d at 714, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 881; Shipp, 97 A.D.2d
at 945, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 743.
18 See, e.g., Folsom, 262 A.D.2d at 876, 692 N.Y.S.2d at 529; In re Kenneth
"H" v. Barbara "G," 256 A.D.2d 1029, 1029, 682 N.Y.S.2d 699, 700 (3d Dep't
1998); Sullivan, 650 A.2d at 884; Wolfe, 899 P.2d at 48. In all of these cases, the
court held that a denial of visitation to an incarcerated parent must be based
upon evidence conspicuous in the record, but the court offered no practical guid-
ance regarding the hearing.
" Studies estimate that 1.6 million children have a father in prison. See infra
note 145 and accompanying text.
25 And, in most cases, the non-custodial parent.
2 See Lehr v. Robinson, 463 U.S. 248, 257 (1983) (finding that the institution
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jority of incarcerated fathers are not currently and have never
been married to the mother of their children.22 However, most
men were living in the same house with at least one of their
children at the time of their arrest. 3
Most of the articles involving children visiting with an
incarcerated parent focus on mothers24 and tend to cast aside
the importance of the father's role in his child's life. The few
articles that do focus on incarcerated fathers put forth an
equal protection analysis that suggests that incarcerated moth-
ers and incarcerated fathers are similarly situated and, thus,
should be treated equally. This Note contends that an equal
protection analysis would not regularly promote the best inter-
of marriage has played a critical role in defining the legal entitlements of family
members and that as part of the "general overarching concern for serving the best
interests of children, state laws almost universally express an appropriate pref-
erence for the formal family"); see also Deborah L. Forman, Unwed Fathers and
Adoption: A Theoretical Analysis in Context, 72 TEX. L. REV. 967, 971 (1994) (not-
ing that "historically, unwed fathers had no rights to custody, visitation or recogni-
tion of their children").
' See Creasie Finney Hairston, The Forgotten Parent: Understanding the Forces
that Influence Incarcerated Fathers' Relationships with Their Children, 37(5) CHILD
WELFARE 617, 620 (1998).
23 Id.
24 See generally BARBARA BLOOM & DAVID STEINHART, NATIONAL COUNCIL ON
CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, WHY PUNISH THE CHILDREN? A REAPPRAISAL OF THE
CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED MOTHERS IN AMERICA (1993); SUSAN L. MILLER, CRIME
CONTROL AND WOMEN, FEMINIST IMPLICATIONS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY (1998);
Development in Law: Alternatives to Incarceration, Alternative Sanctions for. Female
Offenders, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1921 (1998); Philip M. Genty, Procedural Due Pro-
cess Rights of Incarcerated Parents in Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings:
A Fifty State Analysis, 30 J. FAM. L. 757 (1992); Jody L. King, Avoiding Gender
Bias in Downward Departures for Family Responsibilities Under the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines, 1996 ANN. SURv. AM. L. 273 (1996); Donna K. Metzler, Neglect-
ed by the System: Children of Incarcerated Mothers, 82 ILL. B.J. 428 (1994); Wil-
liam Wesley Patton, Mommy's Gone, Daddy's in Prison, Now What About Me?:
Family Reunification for Children of Single Custodial Fathers in Prison-Will the
Sins of Incarcerated Fathers be Inherited by their Children? 75 N.D. L. REV. 179
(1999); Myrna S. Raeder, Gender and Sentencing: Single Moms, Battered Women,
and Other Sex-Based Anomalies in the Gender-Free World of the Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines, 20 PEPP. L. REV. 905 (1993); Stefanie Fleischer Seldin, A Strategy
for Advocacy on Behalf of Women Offenders, 5 COLUM J. GENDER & L. 1 (1995);
Tracy Tyson, Downward Departures Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Par-
enthood and Pregnancy Appropriate Sentencing Considerations? 2 S. CAL. REV. L.
& WOMEN'S STUD. 577 (1993).
25 See Patton, supra note 24, at 180-82; Elise Zealand, Note, Protecting the Ties
that Bind from Behind Bars: A Call for Equal Opportunities for Incarcerated Fa-
thers and their Children to Maintain the Parent-Child Relationship, 31 COLUM. J.L.
& SOC. PROBS. 247, 269-74 (1998).
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est of the child because a court can find that an incarcerated
father is not similarly situated to an incarcerated mother.26
Hence, the court would never reach the issue of whether visita-
tion with an incarcerated father would be beneficial for the
child. Accordingly, this Note proposes that focusing on the
rights and needs of the children to visit with their father 7
would yield more accurate and consistent results that would
truly benefit the child.
This Note will explore the issue of a father's right to have
visitation with his children in prison and will propose guide-
lines to be followed by trial courts in making this visitation
determination so that the best interest of the child is para-
mount. Part I reviews the law regarding the rights of fathers
to have visitation with their children and the impact that in-
carceration has on these rights. This Part also discusses the
unique role that fathers play in the psychological and social
development of their children and how even visits to prison
might facilitate this role. Part II evaluates existing case law
regarding children visiting their fathers in prison. This Part
shows that most trial courts fail to have clear, concise
guidelines in making this visitation decision, resulting in in-
consistent and inadequate protection of the children. Further-
more, this Part demonstrates that the appellate courts, as well
" For example, in Bills v. Dahm, 32 F.3d 333 (8th Cir. 1994), Randall Bills
brought an action against the prison officials of the Lincoln Correctional Center
(the "LCC") alleging violation of his right to equal protection on the grounds that
he was denied overnight visitation with his infant son while some female inmates
incarcerated at the Nebraska Center for Women ("NCW") were permitted such
overnight visits. Id. at 334. The Eighth Circuit held that since the LCC was clas-
sified as a "level 2" security institution (which is a higher level of security) and
the NOW was classified as a "level 4" security institution (which is a lower level
of security), it is "objectively reasonable for a prison official to believe that an
inmate at the LCC is not similarly situated to an inmate at the NOW for purpos-
es of overnight child visitation." Id. at 336. Thus, because a reasonable official
could believe that Mr. Bills was not similarly situated to a female inmate granted
overnight child visitation and that denial of such privileges to Mr. Bills could be
rationally related to a legitimate penological objective, "it was not clearly estab-
lished that Mr. Bills had a right to equal treatment in this case." Id. The court
never even touched upon whether such visitation would have been beneficial for
the child.
2 See Patton, supra note 24, at 196 ("Rather than pitting female and male
prison parents against each other in what appears to be a zero-sum game, per-
haps a better approach is to focus on children's rights and needs, not those of par-
ents.").
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as the trial courts, fail to adequately protect the children. Al-
though many appellate courts reverse trial court visitation
orders due to a lack of proper evidentiary hearings, they fail to
provide meaningful guidance to the trial courts. Therefore,
Part III proposes guidelines for trial courts to follow when
faced with an incarcerated father's petition requesting that his
child visit with him in prison. These proposals will ensure
that, in most cases, the courts reach a decision that is most
beneficial for the child.
I. OVERVIEW OF FATHERS' RIGHTS AND THE NEED TO PROTECT
CHILDREN
A. Constitutional Protection of the Parent-Child Relationship
In 1923, the Supreme Court first articulated its broad
statement that parents have a fundamental right in the care,
control, and custody of their children." This parental right is
inherently embodied in the liberty interest of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution." Two years later, the Su-
preme Court reaffirmed this parental right when it struck
down a statute requiring parents to send their minor children
to public school.3"
Nearly twenty years later, the Court narrowed its broad
statement of parental autonomy when it held that the rights of
parenthood are not beyond state regulation when such regula-
tion is consistent with society's interests.31 Later, the Court
reaffirmed the principles of parental autonomy by stating that
"[t]he history and culture of Western civilization reflect a
strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and up-
bringing of their children. This primary role of the parents in
the upbringing of their children is now established beyond
debate as an enduring American tradition.3 2
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923) (invalidating a statute pro-
hibiting the teaching of children in a foreign language).
29 Id.
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
" Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) (allowing the state to
limit parental freedom where parent allowed a minor child to work in violation of
a state statute).
32 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972). In Yoder, the Supreme Court
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While the rights of parents to raise their children without
state interference seem well protected, the rights of fathers,
particularly unwed fathers, to establish and maintain a rela-
tionship with their biological children remain somewhat uncer-
tain and less protected.
B. Defining Fatherhood and its Rights
The process of defining fatherhood and the rights associat-
ed therewith has been contested in the courts for decades.
Initially, the recognition of fatherhood depended almost entire-
ly upon marriage.13 However, beginning with Stanley v. Illi-
nois,34 the legal meaning of fatherhood was dramatically
changed when the Supreme Court clearly recognized that a
father's connection to his children no longer depended solely
upon his relationship to the children's mother. " Yet Stanley
was an easy case for the Court to decide because, although he
never married the children's mother, Peter Stanley lived with
his children and their mother and actively participated in
raising his children.36
The rights of unwed fathers were truly fleshed out in a
trio of cases that arose in the context of adoption, in each of'
which an unwed father challenged a mother's choice to have
her child adopted by her current husband. First, in Quilloin v.
Walcott, 7 an unwed father challenged a Georgia statute al-
lowing adoption of a child without consent of the biological fa-
ther." Mr. Quilloin did not prevail because the court found
that he had neither supported nor spent substantial time with
his son and that he had taken no action indicative of paternity
before challenging the adoption petition when his son was
more than eleven years old. 9
affimed a judgment of the Wisconsin Supreme Court that invalidated the convic-
tion of parents who were members of the Older Order Amish religion.
33 See supra note 21.
3' 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
2Id.
26 Id. at 666 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
37 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
38 Id. at 247.
29 Id. at 256.
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Second, Caban v. Mohammed ° involved the attempt by
an unwed father to block an adoption by a stepfather. The
father, Mr. Caban, however, had lived with the mother and
their two children for several years and continued to see his
children after their mother left him and married Mr. Moham-
med.4 Under New York law, when a mother married another
man, her husband was allowed to adopt her children without
the consent of the children's biological father.42 The Supreme
Court invalidated the New York statute on the basis of equal
protection, finding that the "gender based distinction" was not
"required by any universal difference between maternal and
paternal relations."" The Court acknowledged that where a
father had actively participated in raising and supporting his
children, he had the same rights as the mother to withhold his
consent to adoption."
The clearest understanding of fatherhood was expressed in
the third case, Lehr v. Robertson,45 where the Court addressed
whether an unwed father's due process rights afforded him a
liberty interest strong enough to defeat the adoption of his
children. Like Mr. Quilloin, Jonathan Lehr had not assumed
any responsibilities as a father in the two years between his
child's birth and the child's subsequent adoption by the
stepfather.46 Although Mr. Lehr claimed that his efforts to
maintain contact with his child were thwarted by his child's
mother, the Court found that, because Mr. Lehr had not fol-
lowed the New York procedure that would have established
him as the father, he was not denied due process when his
parental rights were terminated over his objection.47 In reject-
ing Mr. Lehr's due process claims, the Court set forth its
clearest explanation of when an unwed father acquires the
rights of fatherhood:
When an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the re-
sponsibilities of parenthood by "com[ing] forward to participate in
40 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
41 Id. at 382.
42 Id. at 385 (citing N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111 (McKinney 1977)).
43 Id. at 394.
44 Id. at 392-93.
45 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
41 Id. at 249-50.
47 Id. at 265.
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the rearing of his child"... his interest in personal contact with his
child acquires substantial protection under the due process clause.
At that point it may be said that he "act[s] as a father toward his
children." But the mere existence of a biological link does not merit
equivalent constitutional protection.48
The Court then explained that the importance of the bio-
logical connection "is that it offers the natural father an oppor-
tunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship
with his offspring."4 9 This unique opportunity becomes a con-
stitutionally protected interest only if the father "grasps that
opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for the
child's future."0 Thus, the biological connection between a
father and his child, while important, is not enough to sustain
a protected liberty interest in a father's parental rights. An
unwed father must affirmatively demonstrate his commitment
to being a father by taking some responsibility for the child's
upbringing and future.
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's explanation of when
an unwed father acquires the rights of fatherhood, even where
a father demonstrates his commitment to being a father, tradi-
tional social values of family integrity may defeat his claim. In
Michael H. v. Gerald D,5 a plurality of the Court expressed
that the Fourteenth Amendment only afforded protection to
those interests "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of
our people as to be ranked fundamental."52 Thus, four justic-
es 53 concluded that because history and tradition did not pro-
tect a relationship between a father and his child born of an
adulterous affair, the father, who satisfied the Lehr definition
of fatherhood, would not be recognized as the child's father.54
Although the definition of fatherhood still remains some-
what unclear, what emerges is a recognition that, to qualify as
a father, a man must have a biological connection with his
child and must also establish a committed relationship with
48 Id. at 261 (citations omitted).
'9 Id. at 262.
'0 Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262.
51 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
12 Id. at 122 (citation omitted).
' Justice Scalia announced the judgment of the court and delivered the opin-
ion in which Justice Rehnquist joined and, in all but footnote 6, of which Justice
O'Connor and Justice Kennedy joined.
5' 491 U.S. 110.
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his child. However, even when a man has done so, his claim
may be defeated if it upsets traditional social values of family
integrity."
C. Understanding a Father's Rights to Visitation
A non-custodial parent's56 right to visit with a child is
strongly favored in the law, and it is generally presumed to be
in the best interest of a child to visit with a non-custodial par-
ent unless the court finds that such visitation would endanger
the child's physical or emotional health.57 This right of visita-
tion is derived from the general right of parents to the care,
custody, and control of their children." Moreover, "[tihe fun-
damental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custo-
dy, and management of their child does not evaporate simply
because they have not been model parents or have lost tempo-
rary custody of the child to the State." 9 Thus, many state
courts have held that a parent's incarceration, in and of itself,
is not grounds to deny visitation."
If anything, an incarcerated father has a critical need for
due process protection6 because if a father cannot maintain
contact with his children, he might face a more serious
harm-the termination of his parental rights.62 Because the
" For an in depth discussion and analysis of the rights of unwed fathers, see
generally Forman, supra note 21.
56 A majority of non-custodial parents are fathers.
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-408 (West 2000); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-
17-4-1 (West 1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1616 (1998); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 403.320 (Banks-Baldwin 1999); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.175 (West 1999); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 452.400 (West 1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-22 (1999); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 36-6-301 (1999).
5 See supra notes 28 & 32 and accompanying text.
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
60 See, e.g., Alexander v. Alexander, 900 S.W.2d 615, 616 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995);
Smith v. Smith, 869 S.W.2d 55, 57 (Ky. Ct. App. 1994); Casper v. Casper, 254
N.W.2d 407, 409 (Neb. 1977); Rhynes v. Rhynes, 242 A.D.2d 943, 943, 662
N.Y.S.2d 667, 668 (4th Dep't 1997); Davis v. Davis, 232 A.D.2d 773, 773, 648
N.Y.S.2d 742, 743 (3d Dep't 1996); Simpson v. Finnigan, 202 A.D.2d 592, 593, 609
N.Y.S.2d 265, 266 (2d Dep't 1994); Matter of Wise v. Del Torro, 122 A.D.2d 714,
714, 505 N.Y.S.2d 880, 881 (1st Dep't 1986); Harris v. Burns, 904 P.2d 648, 650
(Or. Ct. App. 1995).
61 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753.
6 See Genty, supra note 24, at 761 (noting that approximately twenty-five
states have termination of parental rights statutes that specifically pertain to
[Vol. 66: 3
2000] INCARCERATED FATHERS AND CHILDREN'S BEST INTEREST 943
parent-child relationship is a protected liberty interest, an
incarcerated parent is entitled to procedural due process,
which includes an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner.' Thus, a father must be
afforded a hearing to decide whether to allow visitation with
his child at the prison facility.'
A father's right to visitation is also supported by societal
interests that point in favor of a father maintaining physical
contact with his children.6" Studies indicate that maintaining
close family ties during incarceration results in decreased
recidivism rates, increased likelihood of family reunification,
and greater potential for success for the parolee.66 In addition,
incarcerated parents); see also Copeland v. Copeland, No. E1999-01514-COA-R3-CV,
2000 WL 336665 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (terminating a father's rights under T.C.A.
§ 36-1-113(g)(6) where a "parent has been confined in a correctional or detention
facility of any type, by order of the court as a result of a criminal act, under a
sentence of ten or more years and the child is under eight years of age at the
time the sentence is entered by the court") (citations omitted).
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976).
See infra Part III.A & III.C.
See, e.g., Vice President Al Gore, Address at the Second National Summit on
Fatherhood in Washington, D.C. (June 15, 1998), available at http-i/www.geo-
cities.com/nafcj/GoreFRmole.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2001) ("[Rle-connecting fa-
thers with their children is a large motivator for the fathers to stay off drugs,
stay away from crime and keep a job."); see also Peter A. Breen, Families in Peril:
Bridging the Barriers, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Dec. 1995, at 99 ("[Mlore research
comes out every year showing that prison visits are a positive, supportive activity
that help the incarcerated parent, the family, the institution and, ultimately, soci-
ety as a whole.").
" See Diane F. Reed & Edward L. Reed, Children of Incarcerated Parents,
24(3) SOC. JUSTICE 152, 168-69 (1997); see also Creasie Finney Hairston, Men in
Prison: Family Characteristics and Parenting Views, 13(1) J. OFFENDER COUNSEL-
ING, SERVICES & REHABILITATION 24, 24 (1988) (finding that studies consistently
show that men who maintain strong family ties while incarcerated and assume
responsible husband and father roles upon release have lower recidivism rates
than those who function without family ties); Kim Harrison, Parental Training for
Incarcerated Fathers: Effects on Attitudes, Self-Esteem and Children's Self-Percep-
tions, 137(5) J. SOC. PSYCH. 588, 589 (1997) (finding that thirty-three inmates who
participated in a Family Reunion Program addressing the needs of incarcerated fa-
thers reported an improved quality of their relationship with their children and
felt more successful in parenting); Margaret Humadi, Breaking Barriers with
Books: A Father's Book-sharing Program from Prison, 40(2) J. ADOLESCENT &
ADULT LITERACY 92, 92 (1996) ("Common threads of daily life that bind parent
and child may slowly loosen during a long separation."); Fox Butterfield, Children
Bear Burden of Jailed Parents, N.Y. TIMES NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 18, 1999, available
at LEXIS NewsGroup File, All ("There is a growing body of research that shows
maintaining family ties while in prison leads to lower rates of re-arrest for the
fathers and makes a difference in the lives of their kids") (quoting Creasie Finney
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inmates who participate in special father programs 67 are usu-
ally better behaved in the prison because they ae afraid of los-
ing their visitation privilege.68
Although an incarcerated father has a liberty interest in
maintaining visitation with his children and such visitation
may have a positive effect on him, this right is not absolute.69
Indeed, careful attention must be given to the rights or inter-
ests of the children who are at the very heart of this visitation
dispute.
D. Protecting the Child of an Incarcerated Father
Although emotional attachments and other forms of nur-
turing are not substitutes for the financial support and securi-
ty that fathers provide when they live with their children, they
Hairston, Dean of the Jane Addams College of Social Work).
" Some examples of programs designed for incarcerated fathers include: (1) a
program designed to help a child experience memorable, positive experiences with
a father and help the father maintain an active relationship with his child, see
Humadi, supra note 66, at 92; (2) a program that provides a pleasant child-orient-
ed area where young children can visit with their jailed parent and that offers
parenting classes and family counseling for all interested inmates who are parents
of young children, see Charlotte H. Rudel & Margaret L. Hayes, Behind No Bars,
CHILDREN TODAY, May-June 1990, at 20; and (3) a program that provides incarcer-
ated fathers with parenting skills training and the opportunity to have weekly
visits with their children (inmates must earn the privilege of the weekly visit by
attending five hours of education sessions and maintaining good behavior in the
classroom and the prison unit); see also Christina Ramirez, PATCHing Torn Fami-
lies, Dads Behind Bars Stay in Touch with Their Kids, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-
NEWS, June 13, 1997, at G1.
" See Joe Hallinan, Family Visits Bring Inmate Closer to Home. Lifer Finds
Special Times Mean A Lot, THE STAR-LEDGER, NEwARK, Feb. 11, 1996, at B1 (re-
porting that wardens believe that visits help manage the behavior of inmates and
increase the odds of rehabilitation); Ramirez, supra note 67, at G1 (reporting that
inmates behave well when visitation privileges must be earned through good be-
havior); Rudel & Hayes, supra note 67, at 22 ("Because a visit involving physical
contact with family members is the highest prison privilege, inmates are careful
not to jeopardize their advantage, and thus they present fewer disciplinary prob-
lems."). '
" See, e.g., M.L.B. v. W.R.B., 457 S.W.2d 465, 467 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970) (hold-
ing that parental right of access is not an absolute one); Harmon v. Harmon, 943
P.2d 599, 603 (Okla. 1997) (stating that a parent has no absolute right to visita-
tion with a minor child in a prison facility); Harris v. Burns, 904 P.2d 648, 652
(Or. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that a non-custodial parent's right to visitation is not
absolute; a primary concern is the best interests of the child); Wolfe v. Wolfe, 899
P.2d 46, 48 (Wyo. 1995) (stating that there is no absolute right to visitation in a
correctional facility).
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are, nonetheless, vital to children and fathers and cannot be
easily disregarded." "How valuable the mature guiding hand
and love of a second parent may be to a child is taught by life
itself. This is surely so when the parent-child relationship is
carefully nurtured by regular, frequent and welcomed visita-
tion."7'
Fathers play a unique and important role in the develop-
ment of their children.72 A father's absence from his child's
life for any reason can negatively impact the child's psychologi-
cal and social development,73 and "a father's imprisonment
has been linked to social, emotional and cognitive delays in
children."74 In particular, the impact of fathers on their chil-
dren has been especially great in the areas of social compe-
tence and social responsibility.75 Fathers also seem to foster
sex role development in their children. 6 Furthermore, "the
quality of fathering that [a] boy receives is generally the most
crucial factor in the positive development of his view of himself
as a male."77 For daughters, positive and frequent nurturing
by their fathers has had a positive impact on their cognitive
development.78
A father's positive impact on a child, however, is seriously
diminished when that father is incarcerated. In general, chil-
dren of incarcerated parents experience a multitude of negative
70 See Hairston, supra note 22, at 621.
71 Weiss v. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d 170, 175, 418 N.E.2d 377, 380, 436 N.Y.S.2d 862,
865 (1981).
72 See Jill Handley Andersen, The Functioning Father: A Unified Approach to
Paternity Determinations, 30 J. FAM. L. 847, 860 (199111992).
7- BONNIE E. CARLSON & NEIL CERVERA, INMATES AND THEIR WIVES: INCARCER-
ATION AND FAMILY LIFE 31 (1992); see also Vice President Al Gore, supra note 65
(stating that the Report of the Federal Interagency Forum for Child and Family
Statistics "confirms earlier findings that children growing up without a father are
more likely to do poorly in school, get pregnant, do drugs and have a hard time
finding and keeping a job").
7 See Andersen, supra note 72, at 860.
7 Ross D. Parke, Perspectives on Father-Infant Interaction, in HANDBOOK OF IN-
FANT DEVELOPMENT 549 (J.D. Osofsky ed., 1979).
"' Michael E. Lamb, Fathers and Child Development: An Integrative Overview,
in THE ROLE OF THE FATHER IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT 17 (Michael E. Lamb ed., 2d
ed. 1981).
7' Cooper v. Cooper, 491 A.2d 606, 621 (N.J. 1984) (Schreiber, J., concurring)
(quoting Henry B. Biller, The Father and the Sex Role, in THE ROLE OF THE FA-
THER IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT 323 (Michael E. Lamb ed., 2d ed. 1981).
"' See Lamb, supra note 76, at 21 (finding that highly involved fathers have an
especially marked impact on the cognitive development of their daughters).
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emotional and psychological behaviors including fear, anxiety,
sadness, anger, loneliness, guilt, low self-esteem, depression,
and emotional withdrawal from friends and family.79 These
children may also become disruptive in the classroom, and
often their academic performance deteriorates.' The extent to
which a child will be affected by the incarceration of a parent
depends upon a number of variables, including the child's age
when the parent was incarcerated, the length of the separa-
tion, the nature of the parent's crime, the length of the
parent's sentence, and the disruptiveness of the incarcera-
tion."' One study found that children who had contact with
their incarcerated parent once a month or less developed sig-
nificant emotional needs.82
According to another study, children whose fathers are
imprisoned for a long period of time often experience confusion
and worry as to whether being sent to prison can happen to
them.8" Furthermore, children who are separated from an in-
carcerated father "have a greater likelihood of becoming crimi-
nals themselves. "'4 Researchers also found that girls may
' See, e.g., Denise Johnston, Parent-Child Visitation in the Jail or Prison, in
CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED PARENTS 136-37 (Katherine Gabel & Denise Johnston
eds., 1995); Garry L. Landreth & Alan F. Lobaugh, Filial Therapy with Incarcerat-
ed Fathers: Effects on Parental Acceptance of Child, Parental Stress, and Child
Adjustment, 76(2) J. COUNSELING & DEVELOPMENT 157, 157 (1998) (citation omit-
ted); Cynthia Seymour, Children With Parents in Prison: Child Welfare Policy,
Program and Practice Issues, 77(5) CHILD WELFARE 469, 472 (1998) (citation omit-
ted); Breen, supra note 65, at 99 (stating that children of incarcerated parents
"are at great risk in all areas of their lives, from basic health needs to completion
of their education"); Daphne Muse, Parenting From Prison, MOTHERING, Sept. 22,
1994, at 13 (stating that ten year old Johnette sometimes feels scared that her fa-
ther is in prison: "Sometimes I feel ashamed and I also wonder what he doesn't
tell me about being in prison").
o Justice Brooks & Kimberly Bahna, "It's a Family Affair"-The Incarceration
of the American Family: Confronting Legal and Social Issues, 28 U.S.F. L. REV.
271, 280 (1994); Travis A. Fritsch & John D. Burkhead, Behavioral Reactions of
Children to Parental Absence Due to Imprisonment, 30 FAM. RELATIONS 83, 85
(1981); Stewart Gabel, Behavioral Problems in Sons of Incarcerated or Otherwise
Absent Fathers: The Issue of Separation, 31 FAMILY PROCESS 303, 306-07 (1992).
81 See Seymour, supra note 79, at 472.
82 See Landreth & Lobaugh, supra note 79, at 163 (citing Rob McPeek and
Peter Tse, Fed. Office of Research and Evaluation, Bureau of Prisons Parenting
Programs: Use, Costs, and Benefits (1988)).
" See Landreth & Lobaugh, supra note 79, at 163 (citing E. Herrman-Keeling,
When Dad Goes to Prison, 11 NURTURING TODAY 10, 14-16 (1988)).
8" See Brooks & Bahna, supra note 80, at 272; see also William H. Sack et al.,
Children of Imprisoned Fathers, 40 PSYCHIATRY 163, 165 (1977) (describing results
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suffer more severe problems related to school performance as a
result of their father's imprisonment than boys.
s5
Visiting with a father in prison can lessen the stress of
separation between a father and child." Furthermore, visita-
tion can enable the child to maintain a healthy relationship
with her father and increase the likelihood of a successful
reunification. Visiting fathers in prison can also alleviate
the fear that children have regarding their father's safety in
prison and correct misconceptions of prison life.s8 Visiting
serves to strengthen the family bond, and maintaining family
ties is "the best hope that the cycle of intergenerational incar-
ceration will be broken." 9
On the other hand, visitation in prison can be both psycho-
logically and physically demanding on a child because the
visiting environment in most prisons is unpleasant, depressing,
and sometimes frightening.' "Visitors are treated, at best, as
of a study which found that sons of incarcerated fathers displayed aggressive,
delinquent, and criminal behavior).
' James D. Jorgensen et al., Addressing the Social Needs of Families of Pris-
oners: A Tool for Inmate Rehabilitation, 50 FED. PROBATION 47, 48 (1986).
"' Susan Hoffman Fishman, The Impact of Incarceration on Children of Offend-
ers, in SERVICES FOR FAMILIES OF OFFENDERS: AN OVERVIEW 94 (1983) ("[Vlisiting
is especially helpful for children because it calms their fears about their father's
health and welfare as well as their concerns about his feelings for them.");
Seymour, supra note 79, at 481.
Seymour, supra note 79, at 481.
See Fishman, supra note 86, at 94 (stating that visits can reduce the fears
children have when their parent is sent to prison); Breen, supra note 65, at 99
(stating that children 'wonder if their parent will ever return, if their parent is
being hurt in prison or even if their parent will die"); Rudel & Hayes, supra note
67, at 23 (stating that children worry about their parents being mistreated, being
denied medical attention, or not being allowed to move about).
"' Breen, supra note 65, at 99.
90 Fishman, supra note 86, at 94 ("Prison visiting rooms are usually drab and
colorless."); Hairston, supra note 22, at 625 ("[Tlhe visiting environment in most
prisons is poor."); Tracy Tyson, Downward Departures Under the Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines: Are Parenthood and Pregnancy Appropriate Sentencing Consider-
ations? 2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 577, 605 n.19 (1993) (same); Rudel &
Hayes, supra note 67, at 20 ("A visit behind bars is really indescribable ....
Your kids see you like you would see an animal in a zoo. There is no way you
can explain to them why you're not allowed to hold them or give them a kiss.");
see also Scott C. v. Marrietta C., 156 Misc.2d 336, 340, 593 N.Y.S.2d 139, 141
(Fam. Ct. Ulster Co. 1992) (finding that because there were no special provisions
for child visitation at the prison facility and because of the uncontradicted testimo-
ny that there was fondling and sexual contact between inmates and visitors, the
facility's visiting room was inadequate to accommodate children).
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unwelcome guests to be barely tolerated and, more often, as
intruders to be kept in line through humiliation and intimida-
tion."9 Most visitors, including children, must wait in line for
hours to be cleared for a visit and are subjected to pat and
frisk searches and rude treatment. 2 Moreover, the visiting
rooms are usually crowded, noisy and dirty and, in most in-
stances, the parent and child are separated by a glass barri-
er.93 In addition, exposing a young child to the truth about
her father might cause irreparable psychological and emotional
harm and impair the child's adjustment to her father's ab-
sence.94 These factors point to the conclusion that visitation at
a prison facility can be traumatic and detrimental to a child,
and therefore, careful consideration must be given to the wel-
fare of the child before visitation is ordered.
II. THE CURRENT APPROACH OF STATE COURTS
A. The "Best Interest of the Child" Standard
The issue of custody and visitation is almost exclusively in
the hands of state and family court trial judges. A judge's pri-
mary consideration in fashioning custody and visitation deci-
9' Hairston, supra note 22, at 625 (citations omitted).
See BLOOM & STEINHART, supra note 24, at 51 (recounting a New York
social worker's description of the day-long ordeal of traveling with foster children
to a local jail using transportation provided by the New York City Department of
Corrections: "After a long wait for the bus, the social worker and the children
often wait additional hours at the jail while the prisoner is found and taken to
the visiting area"); Hairston, supra note 22, at 625 (stating that children stand "in
line for hours to be cleared for a visit that lasts less than half the time spent
waiting"); Michelle Locke, The Children of Inmates Face Prison of Shame and Si-
lence, THE LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, (June 28, 1992) ("Tracy visits her father
about twice a week at Mule Creek State Prison in lone, about 40 miles from her
home near Sacramento California. She has to start out before dawn to get a good
place in line that is out of the sun.").
"' Hairston, supra note 22, at 625; see also BLOOM & STEINHART, supra note
24, at 51 (stating that plastic or glass partitions can intensify feelings of separa-
tion for both the mother and child); Fishman, supra note 86, at 94 (stating that
inmates and their visitors are generally separated by barriers, that in most insti-
tutions the barriers prohibit any touching whatsoever, and that "[ulsually a father
is not permitted to hold his child").
"' See Fusco v. Fusco, 452 A.2d 681, 682 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982) (not-
ing that mother was concerned about taking her four-and-a-half year old daughter
to see her father in prison because exposing her young daughter to the truth
about her father might cause irreparable psychological and emotional harm).
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sions is the best interest of the child, which is the standard for
determining custody and visitation in most American jurisdic-
tions." This standard, however, has been subjected to consid-
erable attack because it is vagues6 and gives precious little
guidance to judicial decision makers." Consequently, it in-
vites judges to engage in virtually unfettered exercises of dis-
cretion in deciding issues of child custody and visitation."
95 See, e.g., Unif. Marriage and Divorce Act § 407, 9A U.L.A. 612 (1987) ("The
general rule implies a 'best interest of the child' standard" for visitation rights,
and that "[viisitation rights should be arranged to an extent and in a fashion
which suits the child's interest rather than the interest of either the custodial or
noncustodial parent."); McAlister v. Shaver, 633 So. 2d 494, 496 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1994) (finding that the best interest of the child controls over parental
rights); Brewer v. Brewer, 760 P.2d 1225, 1227 (Kan. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that
under state statute, the court must consider the best interests of the children
when considering modification of a visitation order); Smith v. Smith, 869 S.W.2d
55, 56 (Ky. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that the state statute created the presumption
that visitation is in the child's best interest); Rogowski v. Rogowski, 251 A.D.2d
827, 827, 674 N.Y.S.2d 480, 480 (3d Dep't 1998) (stating that the primary consid-
eration in deciding the issue of visitation is the best interests of the child); Harris
v. Burns, 904 P.2d 648, 649 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) (stating that a noncustodial
parent's right to visitation is not absolute; a primary concern is the best interest
of the child); Sullivan v. Shaw, 650 A.2d 882, 883 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (finding
that in custody and visitation cases, the paramount concern is the best interests of
the child).
For a comprehensive and detailed summary of the criticisms of the best
interests of the child standard, see Carl E. Schneider, Discretion, Rules, and Law:
Child Custody and the UMDA's Best-Interest Standard, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2215,
2219-25 (1991); see also Annette R. Appell & Bruce A. Boyer, Parental Rights v.
Best Interests of the Child. A False Dichotomy in the Context of Adoption, 2 DUKE
J. GENDER L. & POLy 63, 66 (1995) (arguing that the standard is vague and
subject to arbitrary application); Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best
Interest of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 11-16 (1987) (arguing that the best
interest standard is indeterminate); N. Dickon Reppucci & Catherine A. Crosby,
Law, Psychology, and Children: Overarching Issues, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 4-5
(1993) (arguing that regardless of how it is measured, the best interests of chil-
dren are generally indeterminate).
' See, e.g., Andrea Charlow, Awarding Custody: The Best Interests of the Child
and Other Fictions, in CHILD, PARENT AND STATE 3, 5-6 (S. Randall Humm et al.
eds., 1994) (stating that the "best interests of the child" is not a standard, but "a
euphemism for unbridled judicial discretion"); Catherine A. Crosby-Currie,
Children's Involvement in Contested Custody Cases: Practices and Experiences of
Legal and Mental Health Professionals, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 289, 295 (1996)
(stating that the indeterminacy of the standard vests judges with a great deal of
discretion and very little guidance).
9" See JAMES C. BLACK & DONALD J. CANTOR, CHILD CUSTODY 42 (1990)
("[Lleaving judges with an ultimate standard but with no real guidance on how to
satisfy it puts them in a position of having only two ways to do their job: either
they follow their own instincts or they rely on the expertise of others."); Janet L.
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When deciding the question of whether a child should be
able to visit with her father in prison, the best interest of the
child standard is more a rubric than a useful tool for deciding
this issue. The lack of practical guidance in the standard leads
to arbitrary and inconsistent decision-making and leaves our
vulnerable children unprotected. An exploration of some cases
in which judges decided whether to send children to prison
facilities to visit with their fathers reveals the inconsistencies,
biases, and arbitrariness in deciding this visitation issue.
B. Judicial Decision-Making in the Context of Children
Visiting Their Fathers in Prison
A review of the cases clearly indicates that, in deciding the
question of visitation when the parent is incarcerated, a major-
ity of the courts have failed to set out concise factors to be
considered under a "best interest" standard. This lack of guid-
ance leaves judges to rely on their own instincts, morals, and
values and leads to arbitrary and inconsistent decision-making
that serves no useful purpose in protecting the children.
A paradigmatic illustration'of the unfettered application of
the best interest standard in deciding whether to allow a child
to visit her father in prison is illuminated in In re Marriage of
Brewer and Brewer.9 Terry Brewer, an incarcerated felon,
and his wife Sandra were divorced in April, 1986.0 ° The di-
vorce decree awarded Sandra sole custody of their two minor
children, ages two and four, and denied Terry joint custody
and visitation due to his incarceration in a state penitentia-
ry.'0 ' Terry moved for a modification of the divorce decree,
Dolgin, Suffer the Children: Nostalgia, Contradiction and the New Reproductive
Technologies, 28 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 473, 495 (1996) (arguing that application of the
standard cannot serve the best interests of children in custody cases because "the
best-interest standard depend[s] on the insight and wisdom and thus the world-
view[] of individual judges"); Mary Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in
Contemporary Family Law and Succession Law, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1165, 1181 (1986)
(observing that "the 'best interests' standard is a prime example of the futility of
attempting to achieve perfect, individualized justice by reposing discretion in a
judge or other third party").
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seeking visitation with his children.1 2 Following a hearing,
the trial court denied Terry's motion, stating:
And, I realize ... there is a provision [K.A.R. 44-7-104] for the visi-
tation of children out there .... [Aind my personal opinion is, I
think it would be better... for the children, both socially, psycho-
logically, and otherwise, for those children not to be taken to such a
setting and visit with their father.... I think there's going to be a
whole lot of problems .... I can't see that ... it's to the benefit of
the children to visit their father while he is in prison in that set-
ting .... [Slince I have seen this motion, I have tried to...
think.., and I have not been able to come up with anything that
would merit it. 103
Although the trial judge purported to rest his decision on
the best interests of the children, he based this vital decision
simply on his "personal opinion."" 4 Furthermore, there is no
indication that an attorney had been appointed to represent
the children's interests. While the judge's conclusion to deny
visitation may ultimately have been correct, a decision in this
visitation context based on a judge's personal opinion, without
an evaluation of the salient factors, is untenable.
To exacerbate the personal approach of the trial court, the
Kansas Court of Appeals in Brewer affirmed the trial court's
decision, stating that "the trial court is in the most advanta-
geous position to judge how the interests of the children may
best be served."" 5 By affirming a decision based on a judge's
personal opinion,' the appellate court, too, failed to further
the children's best interests.
Unlike the Kansas Court of Appeals, some appellate courts
have recognized that when deciding whether to allow a child to
visit an incarcerated father, a full evidentiary hearing must be
held. However, these courts still failed to protect the best in-
terest of the child because they did not provide guidance to the
lower courts by articulating a set of factors to be examined.
For example, in In re Kenneth "H" v. Barbara "G,"107 a New
York case, the family court judge determined that the father
102 Id.
'03 Id. at 1126.
104 Brewer, 760 P.2d at 1126.
1 Id. at 1227.
1'G Id.
,01 256 A.D.2d 1029, 682 N.Y.S.2d 699 (3d Dep't 1998).
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
had abused his children, and the judge prohibited the father
from having any contact with his children until he proved that
he had successfully completed therapy for sexual offenders.0 8
Thereafter, the father, who was incarcerated, filed a petition
alleging that he had successfully completed the required thera-
peutic program, and he requested that he be allowed visitation
with his children in the form of written and telephone con-
tact.0 9
The family court judge conducted an informal discussion
with the children's law guardian, the county attorney, and the
children's mother."0 Then, without conducting a formal hear-
ing, the judge dismissed the father's petition for modified visi-
tation with his children."' The appellate division reversed
the family court's denial of visitation and explained that the
paramount consideration in determining whether visitation
should be permitted is the best interests of the children."'
The court stated, "A determination of the children's best in-
terests should only be made after a full evidentiary hearing
unless there is sufficient information before the [trial] court to
enable it to undertake an independent comprehensive review
of the children's best interests.""' Because there was no com-
prehensive evidentiary hearing, the appellate division reversed
the family court's order and remanded for an evidentiary hear-
ing.' Notably, the court did not offer much guidance to the
lower court."'





113 256 A.D.2d at 1029, 682 N.Y.S.2d at 700.
114 Id.
11' Id.; see also Alexander v. Alexander, 900 S.W.2d 615, 616 (Ky. Ct. App.
1995) (reversing a trial court's order denying incarcerated father visitation with his
child because "a parent's incarceration does not suspend, nor deprive him of, his
right to a hearing before he is denied visitation with his child"); Smith v. Smith,
869 S.W.2d 55, 56 (Ky. Ct. App. 1994) (reversing and remanding a trial court's
order denying incarcerated father visitation with his child because "there ha[d
never been an evidentiary hearing, much less a finding, that [the child] would be
endangered in any manner by visiting her father in prison); Sullivan v. Shaw, 650
A.2d 882, 885 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (reversing and remanding the lower court's
denial of visitation and holding that "as long as prisoners seeking visitation have
the opportunity to tell the court how they would marshal their resources to enable
visitation, then they have a meaningful opportunity to be heard"); Wolfe v. Wolfe,
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Similarly, the appellate court in Folsom v. Folsom,"6 an-
other New York case, failed to provide sufficient guidance to
the trial court. While the appellate division recognized that
deciding the question of whether a child should visit with her
father in prison required an evidentiary hearing,"7 the court
failed to delineate the factors to be examined. John Folsom, an
incarcerated father, moved the family court for visitation after
the children's mother stopped bringing the children to the pris-
on." ' The trial court dismissed the father's motion based on
the mother's unsworn allegations that she had encountered
problems with the father during the course of prior visits."'
The appellate division reversed the lower court's denial of
visitation, stating that the record in the case was insufficient
to make a visitation determination.20 The court noted that
the record contained "no sworn testimony or documentary evi-
dence, and [the father] was not given an opportunity to present
evidence, participate by phone or otherwise respond to [the
mother's] allegations." 2' Furthermore, the court opined that
this was "an appropriate case for the appointment of a Law
Guardian to protect the rights of the children."'22
Fortunately, a few courts have recognized that trial courts
need concise guidelines when faced with the question of wheth-
899 P.2d 46, 48 (Wyo. 1995) (holding that denial of visitation to an inmate must
be based upon evidence conspicuous in the record). In all of these cases, the appel-
late courts failed to articulate a set of factors to examine at each hearing and
thus, did not provide practical guidance to the trial courts.
116 262 A.D.2d 875, 692 N.Y.S.2d 529 (3d Dep't 1999).
117 262 A.D.2d at 875, 692 N.Y.S.2d at 530; see also Lonobile v. Betkowski, 261
A.D.2d 829, 829, 689 N.Y.S.2d 790, 790 (4th Dep't 1999) (reversing the denial of
visitation and remitting for a new hearing at which the court shall consider the
full range of factors pertinent to that determination. The court, however, did not
delineate the factors to be examined); Wise v. Del Toro, 122 A.D.2d 714, 714, 505
N.Y.S.2d 880, 881 (1st Dep't 1986) (noting that no Law Guardian was appointed
to represent the child while reversing the lower court's denial of visitation and
holding that there should be a full inquiry before visitation is denied to a parent);
Shipp v. Gaglia, 97 A.D.2d 945, 945, 468 N.Y.S.2d 743, 743 (4th Dep't 1983) (re-
versing lower court's denial of visitation because the record did not include any
expert testimony as to the effect visitation would have on the child, any psycholog-
ical examination of the father, any Law Guardian appointed to represent the child,
or any in camera interview of the child).






er sending a child to visit with her father in prison would be
beneficial for the child. The decision by the Superior Court of
New Jersey in Fusco v. Fusco... illustrates how a court can
provide guidance to the lower courts when deciding this issue.
Tiffany Fusco was born to Lawrence and Denise Fusco in May,
1976.'" The Fuscos divorced in May, 1979, and custody of
Tiffany was granted to Denise subject to visitation rights given
to Lawrence." In the summer of 1979, Lawrence Fusco was
arrested and charged with committing a brutal murder in
which he ambushed his victim on an interstate highway and
bludgeoned him to death.'26 Following a jury trial, Lawrence
was convicted and sentenced to a twenty-three year prison
term for first degree murder that he was to serve at the New
Jersey State Prison at Rahway."7
In December, 1980, Lawrence petitioned the Chancery
Division of the Bergen County Superior Court for bi-weekly
visits with his daughter, Tiffany.'28 Lawrence's petition was
supported by his own affidavit declaring his love for his child
and by additional supporting declarations by his parents and
local political figures all in favor of having Tiffany brought to
prison twice a week to visit with her father.'29 Denise Fusco
filed an opposing affidavit in which she expressed her reluc-
tance to take her then four-and-a-half year-old daughter to see
her father in prison. Ms. Fusco feared that subjecting Tiffany
to the prison environment and exposing her at such a tender
age to the truth about her father "would cause irreparable
psychological and emotional harm and would impair the good
adjustment she had made to the father's absence in the inter-
im."3 ° Denise submitted supporting letters from various
friends and acquaintances and the director of Tiffany's nursery
school, all of which stated that Tiffany should not be taken to
see her father in prison."'
1- 452 A.2d 681 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982).
124 Id.
12 Id. at 682.
126 Id.
127 Id.
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The trial court ordered psychiatric examinations of Law-
rence, Denise, and Tiffany."2 Thereafter, based solely on
equivocal and conflicting documentary submissions by two
psychologists, self-serving certifications by the parties, and
without hearing oral argument, taking any testimony, or mak-
ing any findings of fact, the trial court awarded Lawrence bi-
weekly visits with his daughter at the prison. 33
The New Jersey Appellate Division reversed the trial
court's order, and, pointing to the serious nature of the trial
court's error, the court stated that the visitation decision that
was made "without an evidential basis, without examination
and cross-examination of lay and expert witnesses, and with-
out a statement of reasons is untenable in the extreme."'3 In
its reversal, the New Jersey Appellate Division framed the
issue as follows:
[Wihether the welfare of this child will be promoted or disserved by
visitation with her father under all of these circumstances ....
Although the father may not have forfeited his parental rights as a
result of his heinous crime, nevertheless the answer to the visitation
question must be dictated exclusively by concern for the child's best
interests and not by the conflicting desires, wishes or sensibilities of
the parents and grandparents.13'
The court emphasized that decision-making in this visitation
context "requires the highest degree of care, factual explora-
tion, deliberation and sensitivity to personal and family dy-
namics and motivations."13 6 Moreover, the court explained
that there are a number of factors to be considered at an evi-
dentiary hearing, such as the general desirability of maintain-
ing a paternal relationship between father and child and coun-
tervailing factors, such as the risk of the child's premature
knowledge of her father's crime, the problems inherent in the
environmental constraints of prison visits, the probable effect
132 Id.
133 Fusco, 452 A.2d at 684.
134 Id.
13" Id. (emphasis added); see also Mohammed v. Cortland County Dep't of Social
Serv., 186 A.D.2d 908, 908, 589 N.Y.S.2d 112, 113 (3d Dep't 1992) (affirming the
trial court's denial of visitation since the evidence included the testimony of psy-
chologists, counselors, and the Law Guardian's recommendation and since the
Family Court "was correct in confining its consideration to what is best for the
child and not simply to what might be best for the parent").
13 Fusco, 452 A.2d at 684.
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of these visits on the maternal relationship, and the emotional
and psychological burden that this five-year old child will have
to bear in maintaining a relationship with her father by prison
visitation."7
A similar conclusion was reached by the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania in Etter v. Rose, 8 in which the court opined:
When considering a request for visitation, the primary concern of the
court is what is in the best interest and permanent welfare of the
child .... This determination will be made on a case-by-case basis
and premised on a weighing of all factors which legitimately affect
the child's physical, intellectual, moral and spiritual well-being.1 39
In this case, the trial court denied Michael Etter's petition
for visitation with his minor son at the prison facility, stating
that a "prison is not conducive to establishment of a positive
parent/child relationship."4 ° In reversing that denial and
remanding for a full hearing, the Superior Court detailed the
factors to be examined at such a hearing:
All relevant factors must be considered, including age of the child,
distance and hardship to the child in traveling to the visitation site,
the kind of supervision at the visit, the identification of the person(s)
transporting him and by what means, the effect on the child physi-
cally and emotionally, whether the father has and does exhibit a
genuine interest in the child, whether he maintained reasonable
contacts in the past and any other relevant matters impinging on
the child's best interest.1
4
'
As this Note will demonstrate later, the guidance provided
by the Appellate Division in Fusco" and the superior court
in Etter," should be adopted by all courts deciding whether
137 Id.
"3 684 A.2d 1092 (Pa. Super Ct. 1996).
... Id. (emphasis added).
140 Id.
.4. Id.; see also Jonathan M. v. Superior Court of Orange County, 62 Cal. Rptr.
2d (Cal. Ct. App. 4th 1997) (holding that in determining detriment the court
should consider the age of the minor, the degree of parent-child bonding, the
length of the sentence, the nature of the treatment, the nature of the crime or ill-
ness, etc.); Harmon v. Harmon, 943 P.2d 599, 605 (Okla. 1997) (reversing the
lower court's denial of father's petition for visitation with his son at the prison
and remanding for a hearing. This court, too, gave guidance to the lower court by
incorporating the factors set forth in Etter v. Rose).
142 452 A.2d 681 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982).
" 684 A.2d 1092 (Pa. Super Ct. 1996).
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a child should visit with her father in prison.1' This will en-
sure harmonious decision-making across all jurisdictions and
secure better protection of the children who are at the core of
the visitation dispute.
III. RECOMMENDATION
With the nation's incarceration rate growing each year,
studies estimate that 1.6 million children have a father inprison" and that this figure is likely to increase.'46 Accord-
ingly, as incarcerated fathers exercise their right to have visi-
tation with their children by filing motions or petitions with
the court, courts need clear guidelines to deal with this issue
so that the best interest of the child is always paramount.
To protect the physical, emotional, and psychological wel-
fare of children, the court must fulfill its role as parens patri-
ae 47 and "must put itself in the position of a wise, affection-
ate and careful parent, placing the welfare of the child above
the rights of the parents."4 ' Thus, when faced with the peti-
144 See infra Part III.
14 Christopher J. Mumola, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Special Report, Incarcer-
ated Parents and Their Children, available at httpJ/www.ojp.usdoj.gov/-
bjs/pub/pdf/iptc.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2001) (estimating from 1999 prison sur-
vey: number of fathers in prison, 593,800 (state) and 74,100 (federal); number of
children with fathers in prison, 1.2 million (state) and 163,000 (federal); results
indicate that 45% of male state prisoners and 37% of male federal prisoners were
fathers); see also Susan Phillips & Barbara Bloom, In Whose Best Interest? The
Impact of Changing Public Policy on Relatives Caring for Children With Incarcerat-
ed Parents, 77(5) CHILD WELFARE 531, 531-32 (stating that more than 75% of
women in prison are mothers and approximately 65% of male prisoners are fa-
thers); Seymour, supra note 79, at 470 (finding approximately 200,000 children in
America have a mother in prison and more than 1.6 million have an imprisoned
father).
146 Seymour, supra note 79, at 489 n.1. Seymor noted that the Center for Chil-
dren of Incarcerated Parents developed a formula for calculating these numbers:
To estimate the number of children with incarcerated fathers, multiply
the number of currently incarcerated men by .56 (the average percentage
of incarcerated men with children) and then multiply that number by 2.0
(the average number of children per incarcerated father. Using this for-
mula with 1995 data, 1.4 million incarcerated men [U.S. Department of
Justice 1997] have 1.6 million incarcerated children.
Id.
14 In child custody determinations, parens patriae refers to the principle that
"the state must care for those who cannot take care of themselves, such as minors
who lack proper care and custody from their parents." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
769 (Abridged 6th ed. 1993).
1' Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 433, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (1925); see also Mo-
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tion of an incarcerated father requesting visitation with his
children in a prison facility, this Note proposes that (1) if a
father is incarcerated for committing a violent crime against
any child, a limited hearing should be held before granting a
hearing on the merits of the visitation issue; in the limited
hearing, the father would be required to show, by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, that he has successfully "9 completed
a therapy program dealing with his particular crime; (2) if a
father is incarcerated for the first-degree murder of his child's
mother,"'0 no visitation should be ordered unless the child is
old enough to consent;' (3) for fathers who are convicted of
other crimes and for those fathers who meet the preponderance
of the evidence standard, the court should evaluate certain fac-
tors to ensure that the best interest of the child is served by
having that child visit her father in prison; and (4) the child
should be represented by an attorney at both the limited hear-
ing and the visitation hearing,'52 and a forensic psycholo-
gist I 3 should be appointed by the court at the visitation
hammed v. Cortland County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 186 A.D.2d 908, 908, 589
N.Y.S.2d 112, 113 (3d Dep't 1992) (holding that the Family Court was "correct in
confining its consideration to what is best for the child and not simply what might
be best for the parent").
.. See discussion infra Part III.A.
"5 Likewise, if a mother is incarcerated for the murder of her child's father, no
visitation should be ordered.
151 There is a rebuttable presumption that children age twelve and above are
competent to make decisions regarding their own welfare. See Representing Chil-
dren: Standards for Attorneys and Guardians Ad Litem in Custody or Visitation
Proceedings, 13 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 1, 5-6 (1995); see also Lozada v.
Lozada, 270 A.D.2d 422, 422, 704 N.Y.S.2d 313, 314 (2d Dep't 2000) (affirming the
Family Court's visitation order where court gave proper weight to the children's
wishes where they were of a "sufficient age to articulate their needs and prefer-
ences to the court"); Koppenhoefer v. Koppenhoefer, 159 A.D.2d 113, 117, 558
N.Y.S.2d 596, 599 (2d Dep't 1990) (finding that at the trial regarding visitation,
the trial court should have ascertained the wishes of the children who were four-
teen and twelve years old, an age where their input would be particularly mean-
ingful).
152 See infra Part III.A.
153
The forensic psychologist is a psychologist whose professional activities
are defined by the American Psychological Association or by regulation of
title by state registration or licensure. The forensic psychologist conducts
practice with definable foreknowledge, as a psychological expert on ex-
plicitly psycho-legal issues, in direct assistance to courts, parties to legal
proceeding, correctional and forensic mental health facilities, and adminis-
trative, judicial, and legislative agencies acting in an adjudicative capaci-
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hearing to evaluate the child's situation and make a recom-
mendation to the court. This Note maintains that following
these guidelines will promote more consistent decision-making
across the states and will ensure that the best interest of the
child will be served in every U.S. jurisdiction.
A. Violent Crimes Committed Against Children
Generally, it is presumed that visitation with both parents
is in the best interest of a child, unless it can be demonstrated
to a court that visitation would be detrimental to a child.154
This Note contends, however, that when a father is convicted
of a crime of violence committed against any child,'55 the pre-
sumption should be that visitation with that father is not in
the best interest of his child. It can be assumed that an adult
who is capable of committing a violent crime against a child
does not respect the humanity and personhood of a child. Fur-
thermore, by committing such an act, the adult has taken
advantage of his power and superiority over the child and has
used that power to commit the crime.'56 Children are not
physically or emotionally safe with adults who have hurt other
children. Thus, before sending a child to a prison facility5 to
ty.
Marc J. Ackerman, Specialty Guidelines for Forensic Psychologists, Committee on
Ethical Guidelines for Forensic Psychologists, in CLINICIANS GUIDE TO CHILD Cus-
TODY EVALUATIONS 255 (1995).
.. See, e.g., Alexander v. Alexander, 900 S.W.2d 615, 616 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995);
Folsom v. Folsom, 262 A.D.2d 875, 875, 692 N.Y.S.2d 529, 530 (3d Dep't 1999);
Lonobile v. Betkowski, 261 A.D.2d 829, 829, 689 N.Y.S.2d 790, 790 (4th Dep't
1999); Rhynes v. Rhynes, 242 A.D.2d 943, 943, 662 N.Y.S.2d 667, 667 (4th Dep't
1997); Vann v. Vann, 187 A.D.2d 821, 821, 589 N.Y.S.2d 715, 716 (3d Dep't 1992);
see also supra note 57.
"n For example, crimes such as rape of a minor, sexual or physical abuse of a
minor, and pedophilia. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Shaw, 650 A.2d 882, 886 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1994) (Tamilia, J., dissenting). Judge Tamilia noted that the Custody Act, 23
Pa. C.S. § 5301, provides distinct "directions to consider criminal conduct in deter-
mining custody or visitation awards." Id. Among the crimes to be considered are
endangering the welfare of children and prostitution and sexual abuse of children.
Id.
156 See, e.g., United States v. Peden, 961 F.2d 517, 520 (5th Cir. 1992) (uphold-
ing the admission of a prior conviction of sexual abuse of a minor in a prosecution
for rape and sexual abuse of a minor because the admission showed the intent of
the defendant "to take advantage of one incapable of resisting or unable to appre-
ciate the act, as well as his knowledge that young children are easily victimized").
"" As discussed in Part I.D, supra, prisons present inherent dangers.
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visit with a father convicted of a crime of violence against any
child, the physical and emotional safety of his child must be
assured. 5 '
To adequately protect a child, this Note proposes that a
limited hearing should be granted to a father who seeks visita-
tion with his child but has been convicted of a crime of violence
against any child. At this hearing, the father should be re-
quired to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he
successfully completed a treatment program designed to heal
the underlying problem that caused him to commit the crime.
The preponderance showing, however, would not be satisfied
by a letter saying that the father attended all of the required
therapy sessions. Rather, the father would have to submit
proof from a licensed professional running the program that he
has made significant progress in treatment and would not pose
a danger to his child.
To further protect the child who is the subject of this visi-
tation issue, an attorney for the child should be appointed"5 9
and present at this hearing to examine and cross-examine
witnesses. Only after a father successfully meets the prepon-
derance standard at the limited hearing should a full eviden-
tiary hearing be granted 6 ° to determine whether visitation in
the prison would be in the best interest of his child. If, after a
full evidentiary hearing has been conducted, a judge concludes
that visitation would be beneficial for the child, this Note advo-
cates that such visitation should be supervised at the prison by
a licensed professional 6 trained to work with and sensitive
to the needs of children.
The following case exemplifies how the process outlined
above would operate in practice. Raymond La Rue is serving a
... See, e.g., Inmate Charged with Raping Girl, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 31,
1999. A nine-year old girl was sexually assaulted during most of her sixteen visits
to the Schuylkill County Prison since April, 1998. The inmate, John Mines, knew
when the visiting room guard was occupied and used that opportunity to rape the
girl. Id.
15, See infra Part III.D.
' At this hearing, a judge should examine the factors as set forth, infra, in
Part III.C.
11 The fact that the visitation site is supervised by a prison official is not
enough. A licensed professional must supervise the interaction between the father
and child to ensure that no inappropriate behavior or conversation takes place and
to ensure that the interaction between the father and child is a meaningful one.
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combined prison term of four to twelve years for the rape and
sodomy of his girlfriend's thirteen-year old daughter. 6 2 Ray-
mond petitioned the court for visitation with his children,
Bruce, age twelve, and Danielle, age eight. 63 Following a full
evidentiary hearing in which the children were represented by
independent counsel, the family court dismissed Raymond'spetition."e
Although the court did conduct a full evidentiary hearing
and the children were represented by independent counsel,
additional protection should have been provided for Bruce and
Danielle. As recommended in this Note, when Raymond peti-
tioned the court for visitation with his children, the court
should have first granted a limited hearing in which Raymond
would have been required to show, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that he had already completed a treatment program
designed for sexual abusers of children.'65 This showing
would require, at a minimum, written proof from a licensed
professional running the program that Raymond had made
significant progress in treatment and would no longer pose a
danger to a child. Only after such a showing had been made
should a full evidentiary hearing on the visitation issue take
place.' This approach would place the children's well-being
before the interest of a father by not subjecting the children to
the physical and emotional rigors of a courtroom proceeding
until necessary.
16 La Rue v. Crandall, 254 A.D.2d 633, 634, 679 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dep't
1998).
163 Id.
164 There was substantial proof that visitation would be harmful to the children.
Crandall, 254 A.D.2d at 634, 679 N.Y.S.2d at 206.
' See, e.g., Rogowski v. Rogowski, 251 ALD.2d 827, 828, 674 N.Y.S.2d 480, 481
(3d Dep't 1998). Thomas Rogowski is serving a sentence of 8 1/3 to 25 years upon
his conviction of two counts of rape in the first degree and one count of endanger-
ing the welfare of a child. The court denied Thomas' petition for visitation with
his six year old daughter because his incarceration arose out of his inappropriate
sexual conduct toward his niece and Thomas had not received any sexual abuse
counseling while in prison. Id.
1" As will be discussed in Part III.D, infra, a child should be represented by
independent counsel at both hearings. Furthermore, at the full evidentiary hearing,
a forensic psychologist should be appointed to evaluate the parties and the factors
delineated in Part III.C, infra, should be examined.
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The crime of pedophilia, however, presents a more prob-
lematic dilemma than do other kinds of criminal child abuse
because pedophilia is difficult to treat. 7 and because the re-
cidivism rate is very high."6 Indeed, the psychiatric profes-
sion describes pedophilia as a disorder characterized by "at
least six months [of] recurrent, intense sexually arousing fan-
tasies, sexual urges or behaviors involving sexual activity with
a prepubescent child or children (generally age thirteen years
or younger)."'69 Generally, for the pedophile who sexually
abuses male children, the drive to molest is usually more
chronic than the pedophile who sexually abuses female chil-
dren." In fact, the recidivism rates for men who prefer male
children is almost double the rates of those who molest female
children.' 7 ' Thus, because the crime of pedophilia is so prob-
lematic, it is particularly important that family court judges
adhere to the two-step hearing requirement.
The concern is that while in prison, pedophiles are not
around children, so their urge to re-offend tends to subside.
Consequently, there is a danger that when a child is sent to
visit with her father who has been convicted of pedophilia, the
father's urge to molest a child may re-emerge. Accordingly, a
convicted pedophile must show, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that he has successfully learned to control his sexual
urges.'72 Subsequently, should a court find after a full eviden-
tiary hearing that visitation would benefit the child, strict
supervision at the visitation site by a licensed psychologist who
17 See Katie Isaac, Note, Kansas v. Hendricks: A Perilous Step Forward in the
Fight Against Child Molestation, 35 HouS. L. REV. 1295, 1327 (1998) (explaining
that while several studies indicate that comprehensive treatment of pedophilia has
a ninety percent or better success rate, other experts caution that while pedophiles
may. learn how to control their behavior, they can never be cured).
16 See Palmer v. Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 547 So.2d 981, 984
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1989) (noting that studies show that the rate of
recidivism from the medical standpoint is extremely high).
169 AMERICAN PSYCBIfTmIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS 528 (4th ed. 1994).
170 See Melissa R. Saad, Note, Civil Commitment and the Sexually Violent Pred-
ator, 75 DENv. U. L. REV. 595, 604 (1998).
171 Id.; see also Palmer, 547 So. 2d at 984 (noting that "studies show and ex-
perts agree ...that there is no easy 'cure' for this disorder and the rate of recid-
ivism from the medical standpoint is extremely high").
12 A father would have to prove this by submitting written documentation by a
licensed professional that he has successfully completed treatment and would not
pose a danger to his child.
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has been trained to work with pedophiles and sexually abused
children must be mandated to ensure the safety of the visiting
child.
Thus, the question that arises is whether restricting a
convicted father's right to a hearing on the visitation issue
until he meets the standard proposed by this Note would in-
fringe upon the father's procedural due process rights. This
determination is governed by the three-factor test espoused by
the Supreme Court in Matthews v. Eldridge,'73 which in-
volves the evaluation of three distinct factors:
(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2)
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the government's interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.74
The private interest that would be affected by implement-
ing this Note's proposal is a father's right to associate with his
child-a protected liberty interest."5 While the father might
be deprived of his visitation right, this deprivation is only
temporary; when the father makes the showing necessary
under the limited hearing, he would then be allowed to proceed
to a visitation hearing. In addition, any risk of erroneous de-
privation of the father's right to associate with his child is
lessened because a father is given a hearing, albeit a limited
one. If, in fact, there is a risk of error at all, that risk should
fall on the side of protecting the child.
The government's interest in the visitation issue may be
deemed compelling-protecting the physical and emotional
well-being of a minor child. The need to protect the child from
possible deleterious effects of visiting with a father convicted of
crimes against a child, coupled with the dangers inherent in
visiting a prison facility, should supercede the limited loss of
rights that the father will experience by having to satisfy the
preponderance of the evidence standard in the initial limited
' 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
174 Id. at 335.
171 Parents' right to associate with their children is a protected liberty interest
under the Fourteenth Amendment. See supra Part I.A.
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hearing. Thus, when balancing the factors set forth in
Matthews, it is unlikely that imposing the requirements set
forth in this Note would infringe upon the due process right of
the incarcerated father.
B. Incarceration for First-Degree Murder
Another special consideration arises when a father has
been convicted of the first-degree murder of his child's moth-
er. 76 It is simply not in the best interest of a child to visit
with such a father. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania said it
best when it explained that "[b]arring criminal acts committed
upon the child, we can think of no action in which a parent
could engage posing a graver threat to a child's welfare than
killing the other parent. In one grim swoop, the father has
deprived his child of both parents' guidance and support."7 '
This child has to deal with the loss of her mother, knowing it
was her father that caused that loss. It is difficult to believe
that a father who callously took his child's mother away is
really interested in the welfare of his child.78
Recognizing the need to protect children from further emo-
tional harm after the brutal loss of a parent, some states have
passed statutes that deny visitation to the parent convicted of
first-degree murder of that child's other parent. For example,
in 1997, the Massachusetts legislature enacted "Lizzie's Law,"
which prohibits any court in the State of Massachusetts from
fashioning an order which would allow for visitation with the
child by a parent convicted of first-degree murder of the other
parent. 79 New York enacted a similar law known as the
"Lee-Anne Cruz Memorial Act."'80 However, New York went
further than Massachusetts and mandated that no court shall
make an order providing for visitation to a person who is con-
... See, e.g., Edgar 0. v. Superior Court, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 540, 544 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2d Dist. 2000); Albright v. Peterson, 539 S.E.2d 919, 920-21 (Ga. Ct. App.
2000).
'7 Green v. Sneeringer, 635 A.2d 1074, 1077 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
178 Id.
179 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, ch. 208 § 28, ch. 209 § 37, ch. 209C § 3(a)
(West 1999).
-8 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240 (McKinney 1996) (amended in 1997 to in-
clude the Lee-Ann Cruz Memorial Act).
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victed of murder in the first or second degree of a "legal custo-
dian, legal guardian, sibling, half-sibling or step-sibling of any
child who is the subject of the proceeding." 8'
Although these statutes have not yet been challenged as a
possible violation of the Due Process Clause, they would proba-
bly withstand such a constitutional challenge"8 2 because the
parental right of a father to visit with his child is not termi-
nated forever. Rather, it is suspended temporarily until such
time as the child is old enough to decide whether she wishes to
visit with her father in prison." Under these extenuating
circumstances, the interests of the child must be paramount
and must supercede the rights of the father." In addition,
the child is already emotionally traumatized by the loss of her
parent. Forcing that child to visit with the parent who brutally
took away the other parent would only serve to perpetuate the
emotional harm.
181 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240(l)(h)(1-c)(a). When New York first enacted
the Lee-Ann Cruz Memorial Act in 1997, the Act provided only that no visitation
be ordered to a parent convicted of the first or second degree murder of a child's
other parent. See Kowalczyk, infra note 182, at 1268 n.149. In 1999, New York
amended § 240 of the Domestic Relations Law to prohibit visitation to a parent
convicted of the first or second degree murder of a legal custodian, legal guardian,
sibling, half sibling, or step sibling. The judicial memorandum that accompanied
the amendment explained that there was "no reason to distinguish between mur-
der of a parent and murder of a sibling . . . when determining whether custody or
visitation furthers the 'best interests of the child.' " See McKinney's 1999 Session
Law News of New York, Judicial Memorandum relating to ch. 378, Memorandum
of Office of Court Administration (NY Legis. J. Memo 378 (1999)).
182 For a concise argument as to why these statutes would not violate the Due
Process Clause, see generally Danice M. Kowalczyk, Note, Lizzie's Law: Healing
the Scars of Domestic Murder-An Emerging National Model, 64 BRoOK. L. REV.
1241 (1998). But cf. Hillary R. Stein, Note, Massachusetts' 'Lizzie's Law": Protec-
tion for Children or Violation of Parents' Constitutional Rights? 78 B.U. L. REV.
1547 (1998) (arguing that Lizzie's Law is an unconstitutional means to achieve a
desired end).
1" Both Massachusetts and New York law provide that a court may order visi-
tation where the child is of suitable age to signify assent and where such child
assents to the visit. See supra notes 179-181.
'" See Mara Youdelman, The Post-Separation Family Violence Relief Act: Its
Impact on Custody and Visitation Cases Involving Domestic Violence, 13 PROB. L.J.
189, 191 (1996); Kowalczyk, supra note 182, at 1285.
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C. Factors to be Examined at Visitation Hearing
As an additional measure of protection for children, this
Note proposes that certain factors should be examined at the
hearing of any incarcerated father"s requesting visitation
with his child in prison. Before looking to these factors, howev-
er, a threshold determination should be made to ascertain
whether the incarcerated father has established a parental and
emotional bond with the child with whom he wishes to have
visitation.8 ' This Note does not suggest that the relationship
between the father and child must have been a custodial one.
Rather, the issue to be determined is whether the father estab-
lished a substantial nurturing relationship with his child such
that the child has a present positive memory of her father.
An incarcerated father has a continuing obligation to com-
municate with and maintain an interest in his child to the best
of his ability. Thus, an important indicator of parental involve-
ment would be the extent to which an incarcerated father has,
through his actions while incarcerated, manifested a continu-
ing interest in being a parent to his child."8 7 For the father
who has been incarcerated for most of his child's life, proof of
an attempt to establish a relationship would include whether
the father maintained contact with his child by telephone
and/or correspondence.' If the evidence presented at the
hearing proves that there is no substantial parental relation-
ship between an incarcerated father and the child with whom
" This would include those fathers convicted of violent crimes against children
who have met the preponderance of the evidence standard in the limited hearing
as proposed in Part III.A, supra. This, of course, does not include those fathers
convicted of the first degree murder of the mother of a child with whom the fa-
ther wishes to visit or those fathers convicted of violent crimes against children
who have not met the preponderance of the evidence standard.
18 See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
18 The Supreme Court of Minnesota offered a concrete explanation:
If a parental relationship existed prior to a [parent's] imprisonment and
he continued this relationship to the best of his ability during incarcera-
tion through letters, cards and visits where possible, and through inquiry
as to [the] children's welfare, his parental rights would be preserved,
both because of his actions and for the benefit of [the] children.
Staat v. Hennepin County Welfare Bd., 178 N.W.2d 709, 713 (Minn. 1970).
1" If attempts by the father to maintain contact with his child were thwarted
by the child's mother, that fact should be elicited during the hearing and, if prov-
en, should not be held against the father.
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he seeks visitation, such visitation would not be in the best
interest of the child. Thus, visitation at the prison facility
should not be ordered.
The denial of visitation, however, should not be a perma-
nent one. A father who truly wants to establish a relationship
with his child should be allowed to correspond with and tele-
phone his child, and the custodial parent should not be permit-
ted to interfere with this contact. A father can renew his visi-
tation request when he believes that a positive relationship
has been developed.
After establishing that a substantial parental bond exists
between an incarcerated father and his child, the following fac-
tors,8 9 as suggested by the courts in Fusco"9 and Etter,9'
should be analyzed: age of the child; distance and hardship to
the child in traveling to the prison; the visitation area at the
prison, including the type of supervision at the visitation site;
the effect of the visit on the child physically, emotionally, and
psychologically; and the nature of the crime. An assessment of
these factors will facilitate a court's determination as to wheth-
er visitation would be beneficial for the child. It is important
that courts faced with this visitation dilemma evaluate the
same factors to ensure adequate protection for all children
involved in this type of visitation dispute. To assist the court
in assessing these factors, a child should have independent
counsel and the court should appoint a forensic psycholo-
gist.19
2
D. An Attorney for the Child and a Forensic Psychologist
Should be Appointed
Generally, the voice of a child goes unheard during a pro-
ceeding to decide whether the child should visit with her father
in prison.'93 Unfortunately, judges and attorneys tend to cam-
... This is not an exhaustive list of factors, but this Note contends that these
are the important factors to be considered uniformly at every hearing to determine
whether a child should visit with her father in prison.
'9 452 A.2d 681 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982).
191 684 A.2d 1092 (Pa. Super Ct. 1996).
12 See supra note 153.
192 See generally Brewer v. Brewer, 760 P.2d 1225 (Kan. Ct. App. 1988); Alexan-
der v. Alexander, 900 S.W.2d 615 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995); Smith v. Smith, 869 S.W.2d
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ouflage the issues of concern about the child by focusing their
attention on the rights of the father.194 This is of great con-
cern because the outcome of these proceedings will have a
substantial impact on the child for the rest of his or her life.
Moreover, the adversarial nature of the proceeding hinders the
parents from focusing on the best interest of their child.
A child involved in a court proceeding to determine wheth-
er she visits with her father in prison will be better served by
having her own attorney.' This visitation decision involves
the balancing of several important factors, including the dan-
gers inherent at the prison, the nature of the father's crime
and how that will impact the child, and the age and vulnera-
bility of the child. With such pressing issues present, a child
should have her own attorney to ensure that her best interests
are sufficiently considered through comprehensive, factual
development.
Some of the objectives that have been articulated by advo-
cates for the appointment of counsel for a child in a custody
proceeding'96 are even more pronounced in a proceeding to
55 (Ky. Ct. App. 1994); Folsom v. Folsom, 262 A.D.2d 875, 692 N.Y.S.2d 529 (3d
Dep't 1999); Shipp v. Gaglia, 97 A.D.2d 945, 468 N.Y.S.2d 743 (4th Dep't 1983);
Harris v. Burns, 904 P.2d 648 (Or. Ct. App. 1995); Wolfe v. Wolfe, 899 P.2d 46
(Wyo. 1995). In all of these cases, no law guardian was appointed.
' See supra Part .C (discussing the rights of fathers); see also Alexander, 900
S.W.2d at 616 (finding that a father, even though incarcerated, is entitled to a
hearing on the visitation issue); Sullivan v. Shaw, 650 A.2d 882, 884 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1994) (stating that incarcerated parents who petition courts for visitation are
entitled to a hearing); Wolfe, 899 P.2d at 47 (explaining that while there is no
absolute right to visitation in a prison facility, an inmate must be afforded an
opportunity to be heard).
" For a poignant and in depth look at the importance of recognizing children's
rights and giving them a voice in our legal system, see generally Suellyn
Scarnecchia, Imagining Children's Rights, 12 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 1 (1995); see
also Leonard P. Edwards, A Comprehensive Approach to the Representation of Chil-
dren: The Child Advocacy Coordinating Council, 27 FAM. L.Q. 417, 417-18 (1993)
(advocating that when children have a significant interest in a legal proceeding,
they should have effective and independent representation to address their legal
and non-legal needs).
"' For a concise and thoughtful understanding of the need for effective repre-
sentation of children, see generally Edwards, supra note 195; Jinanne S.J. Elder,
The Role of Counsel for Children: A Proposal for Addressing a Troubling Question,
35 BOsTON BAR J. 6 (1991); Robert E. Shepherd & Sharon S. England, I Know the
Child is My Client, But Who Am I?, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1917 (1996); Ellen B.
Wells, Unanswered Questions: Standing and Party Status of Children in Custody
and Visitation Proceedings, J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. (Summer 1995).
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determine whether a child visits with a father in prison. The
adversarial and emotionally charged nature of this visitation
dispute would, undoubtedly, prohibit parents from focusing on
the best interest of their child. For example, many times a
father must petition the court for visitation because his child's
mother refuses to bring the child to the prison.19 The mother
may have several reasons why she may not want to bring the
child to the prison that have nothing to do with whether the
visit would be good for the child.' 9 Thus, a mother may not
be concerned with what is best for her child but rather what
she can do to prevent the visitation. In such a situation, if the
only parties that are represented are the parents, the interests
presented to the court will be those of the parents, not the
child. Consequently, the evidence presented at the hearing
may fail to accurately portray the existing father-child rela-
tionship or the child's attitudes and feelings toward her father.
Therefore, to ensure a fair process and to ensure that the pro-
ceedings are, indeed, directed towards the best interests of the
child, children of incarcerated parents must be represented by
independent counsel. The child's attorney would provide an
independent view of the circumstances and would encourage a
more complete record, ensuring the court's ability to determine
the best interests of the child.' 99
To further protect the best interests of the child, the court
should require the assistance of a forensic psychologist °° who
is trained in child development. Children's needs vary depend-
191 See, e.g., Smith, 869 S.W.2d at 55; Folsom, 262 A.D.2d at 875, 692 N.Y.S.2d
at 530; see also Fishman, supra note 86, at 94 (stating that many mothers with
young children do not want to "undertake what will amount to an exhausting and
expensive effort on a regular basis for a very limited amount of visiting").
198 For instance, a mother may have other young children at home, she may
have a job which prevents her from bringing the child for a visit, or she may be
angry at the father for putting her in this position.
'9' It is unclear whether the role of the child's attorney should be that of an
advocate, in which the attorney decides what is in the best interest of the child
and promotes that interest, or whether the attorney should be guided by the
child's expressed views. See, e.g., Martin Guggenheim, Reconsidering the Need for
Counsel for Children in Custody, Visitation and Child Protection Proceedings, 29
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 299, 306-07 (1998); Ann M. Haralambie, The Role of the Child's
Attorney in Protecting the Child Throughout the Litigation Process, 71 N.D. L. REV.
939, 940 (1995); Marvin R. Ventrell, Essay, Rights and Duties: An Overview of the
Attorney-Child Client Relationship, 26 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 259, 260 (1995).
2" See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
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ing upon their age, stage of development, personal coping capa-
bilities, and other pertinent factors. An understanding of these
factors for each particular child in the context of the child
visiting with her father in prison is essential to serving the
best interests of the child. A forensic psychologist provides the
necessary nexus between psychology and the law by using
analytical skills and sorting out psycho-legal issues so that
they are both cogent and understandable to the court."'
Accordingly, a licensed forensic psychologist who has expe-
rience with issues relating to parent-child relationships and
who understands the impact of a prison environment upon
children of different ages will assist the judge in reaching a
decision that is truly in the best interest of the child. The
expert's assistance will help compensate for the lack of special
training of judges and attorneys to deal with the unique psy-
cho-legal issues that arise when an incarcerated father peti-
tions the court for visitation with his child in prison.
CONCLUSION
Society can no longer ignore the 1.6 million children who
have a father in prison. Fathers play too important a role in a
child's life, even when the father is incarcerated. Accordingly,
as more incarcerated fathers petition the courts for visitation
with their children in prison, courts should have concise guide-
lines to ensure the adequate protection of the child. Adopting
the proposals outlined in this Note would lead to more predict-
able results and is a necessary step toward tipping the scale in
favor of protecting a child.
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201 Jack S. Annon, Psychologists Who Make Unqualified Public Statements About
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